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Abstract 
This paper mainly explores the relation between initial returns and audits by the big four accounting firms (the Big Four) 
in China. The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2012 (the new accounting standards in China is 
implemented after January 2007 for integrating with the international standards), and selected 1,069 IPO firms listed in 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in this paper. 
Many previous studies have proposed the Informational Hypothesis, which states that the initial returns of IPOs being 
audited by the Big Four are lower than those IPOs being audited by other accounting firms. Oppositely, this paper 
proposes the Snap-up Hypothesis due to consider the IPOs in mainland China are characterized by “three lows,”: the 
low reliability of audits being performed by non-Big Four, low proportion of IPOs audits being performed by the Big 
Four, and low balling ratio. These “three lows” features indicate that the Snap-up Hypothesis applies in the IPOs market 
of mainland China. In other words, the initial returns of the IPOs being audited by the Big Four are higher than those 
IPOs being audited by other accounting firms due to the Big Four have the superior reputations. 
This paper further collects the trading volumes and the turnover ratio on the first day, and selects the Big Four audited 
IPOs by snap-up tide. As above mentioned, because the snap-up tide and raised stock prices on the first-day listing, 
investors may purchase the shares when offering and sell them on the first-day listing to obtain considerable profits.  
Keywords: four accounting firms, initial return,Informational Hypothesis, Snap-up Hypothesis 
1. Introduction 
Initial public offerings (hereafter IPOs) are a critical research topic in financial and economic area. Previous studies 
related to IPOs have focused mainly on three aspects of IPOs, including short-term underpricing, hot-issue markets, and 
long-term underperformance. Beatty (1989), Michaely and Shaw (1995), Su and Fleisher (1999), Chen and Li(2004), 
Chi and Padgett (2005), Yang et al. (2007), X.Chang et al. (2008), Qiu et al. (2013), and Hu and Feng(2013) have 
discussed short-term IPOs discounts. 
In previous studies, IPO short-term underpricing has been found to be an international phenomenon. In the stock 
markets of 39 countries, the average rates of initial return (hereafter IR) of IPOs are positive, and IPOs underpricing in 
China is the highest in the world (Tian, 2011). Because of the economic development of China and the rapid 
development of the Chinese stock market, investors and firm managers have focused increasing attention on the high 
underpricing in the Chinese stock market1.  
                                                        
1On Nov. 30, 2013, China Securities Regulatory Commission issued Opinions on Further Promoting the Reform of 
IPOs System, in which the Commission pointed out that it would strengthen restrictions against “IPOs speculation”.  
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The IRs of IPOs are also referred to as the extent of underpricing. This paper explores the relation between IRs and 
audits by the big four accounting firms (the Big Four)2. 
Previous studies, including those by Rock (1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Teoh and Wong (1993), Beatty (1989), 
Michaely and Shaw (1995), and Lee et al. (2011), have found that audits performed by accounting firms with superior 
reputations may provide investors with more reliable financial information as well as help to reduce asymmetric 
information and investor risk. Association with the Big Four can signal to investors that investing in firms is safe, which 
can lower information asymmetry, investor risk, and IPO IRs. That is called “Lower Information Asymmetry Hypothesis” 
in the literature.  
Because the IRs are calculated by [(P1 - P0) / P0 ], where P1 and P0 are the closing price on the first day of listing and the 
offering price respectively. It has to be noticed that lower information asymmetry will cause smaller decline of offering 
price P0 in the issue markets. Many empirical studies have supported this hypothesis, including the studies of Balvers et 
al. (1988), Beatty (1989), and Holland and Horton (1993), which examined IPOs in the USA and UK. 
As the table 1 of descriptive statistics shows, the IRs of IPOs of the listed companies audited by Big Four CPA firms are 
higher, which may be caused by “three lows” characteristics of China IPOs market (the low reliability of audits 
performed by accounting firms other than the Big Four, low proportion of IPOs audits performed by the Big Four, and 
low balling ratio). Thus, this study proposes “Snap-up Hypothesis”. These “three lows” cause investors to snap up 
shares offered by firms audited by the Big Four on the first day of listing and raise the closing price on the first day, 
causing the closing price to be much higher than the offering price, indicating high IPOs underpricing. It is worth noting 
that “Snap-up Hypothesis” will raise the closing price P1 on the first day in the secondary markets.  
Therefore, the audit firm reputation may have the effects, which are “Lower Information Asymmetry Hypothesis” and 
“Snap-up Hypothesis”, the former is occurred when lowering the decline of offering price in the issue market; and the 
latter is occurred when raising the closing priceon the first day in the secondary market. The prior studies fines the 
effect of “Lower Information Asymmetry” is dominated in most IPOs markets, but this study fines the effect of 
“Snap-up Hypothesis” is dominated in China IPOs market. Few empirical studies have been conducted on this 
hypothesis. However, Chang et al. (2008) empirically studied this hypothesis by examining listed firms in Australia. 
They found that the IRs on IPOs of firms associating with high quality auditors were generally higher than those of 
firms associating with common auditors. These results support the Snap-up Hypothesis. 
Since 2004, scholars in mainland China have performed many studies on the relation between IPOs underpricing and 
auditor reputation for Chinese enterprises. However, the results of these studies have varied. Chen and Li (2004) as well 
as Zeng and Shi (2011) found that auditing by accounting firms with superior reputations may significantly lower the 
extent of underpricing. Moreover, Liu and Tan(2009) as well as Wang, Xin, and Yang(2009)found in their studies on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges that IPOs of firms audited by the Big Four were more underpriced. In other 
words, these studies support the Informational Hypothesis. However, the studies by Qiu et al.(2013) on small- and 
medium-sized enterprise(SME) boards concluded that IPOs of firms audited by accounting firms with superior 
reputations were not more underpriced. However, Hu and Feng(2013) found that high quality auditors could increase 
the IRs of IPOs. Furthermore, Song,Tan, and Yi (2014) divided the IRs of IPOs into two parts, underpricing from issue 
markets3and overvaluation from secondary markets, and found through empirical study that the reputation of 
underwriters positively correlated with IPO underpricing. The results of these empirical studies thus support the 
Snap-up Hypothesis. 
The theoretical arguments and various empirical results regarding the relation between IPOs underpricing and auditor 
reputation for Chinese enterprises make this topic appealing for researchers. Although scholars dispute which 
hypothesis more accurately reflects the relation between IPOs underpricing and auditor reputation, this paper argues that 
in practice both hypotheses are true to an extent and produce corresponding effects. On this basis, this paper contends 
that the primary issue is not which of the two hypotheses is true but rather which of the hypotheses is more dominant. 
This paper selects IPOs in mainland China as the object of study and discusses the relation between IRs and audits by 
the Big Four.  
                                                        
2There were five Big Four joint ventures in Chinese Mainland, PwC Zhongtian, DT Huayong, E&Y Huaming, E&Y 
Dahua and KPMG Huazhen before 2008. However after the consolidation of E&Y Huaming and E&Y Dahua in 
December 2008, the Big Four joint ventures in Chinese Mainland are PwC Zhongtian, KPMG Huazhen, DT Huayong 
and E&Y Huaming, respectively. 
3The mainstream is that the initial return is also called IPOs underpricing, refers to the phenomenon that the close price 
is higher than the offering price on the first day of listing. While some scholars thought that the initial return and IPO 
underpricing are totally different concepts. In this paper we take the mainstream point. 
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This paper uses 1,069 A-share IPOs in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from January 2007 to December 
2012 as empirical samples to discuss the relation between IRs and audits by the Big Four. Compared with other major 
IPOs markets, the IPOs market in mainland China is characterized by “three lows,” which is explained as follows. 
First, compared with other major IPOs markets, the proportion of listed firms audited by the Big Four is low in the IPO 
market in mainland China. For example, among the 1,069 IPOs firms in our study, only 40 were audited by the Big Four, 
indicating a proportion of 3.74%. This proportion is extremely low compared with other major stock markets. For 
example, Lee et al. (2011) found that 383 of the 434 IPOs firms in Taiwan were audited by the Big Four, indicating a 
proportion of 88.25%. Additionally, Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) found that 90.44% of listed firms were 
audited by the Big Four for IPOs in the USA. Furthermore, Fan and Wong (2005) found proportions of 88.32% in 
Indonesia, 74.86% in Malaysia, and 72.37% in Korea. Finally, Chang et al. (2008) found a proportion of 46% in 
Australia, which is lower than those in the aforementioned countries but higher than that in mainland China. 
Second, compared with those in other major IPO markets, the financial reports of listed firms in the IPO market in 
mainland China are less reliable. The reliability of the financial reports of listed firms in mainland China has been 
widely criticized (Cai et al., 2008; Lin and Lin, 2009; Ferri and Liu,2010; the credit rating and certification center of the 
research institute of the Ministry of Commerce, 2013, 2014). According to the Appraisal Report on Financial Safety of 
Non-financial Listed Firms in China in 2013(2014), jointly released by the credit rating and certification center of the 
research institute of the Ministry of Commerce and the Economy Web of China Review (a monthly journal), 766 of 
2,230(744 of 2,213) listed firms were suspected offorging financial statements, representing 34.35%(34.32%) of the 
samples. This report also stated that false financial statements of listed firms in mainland China are a serious problem. 
For example, 96 real estate firms in mainland China (over 70%) are suspected of forging financial records. Cai et al. 
(2008) asserted that financial statements audited by the Big Four are highly reliable, whereas those audited by other 
accounting firms are not sufficiently reliable.  
Third, the IPO market of mainland China tends to be a hot-issue market. The average balling ratio is very low (1.2%), 
and the minimum balling ratio value is only 0.66%. In other words, only 6.6 of every 1,000 applicants succeed in 
subscribing. 
Based on the previous analysis, the characteristics of the IPO market in mainland China can be summarized as the 
“three lows”. These characteristics are different from the features of the IPO market in Australia studied by Chang et al. 
(2008). Would the effect and influence of the two aforesaid hypotheses differ in such a market? Which hypothesis, the 
Informational Hypothesis or Snap-up Hypothesis, would dominate in the IPO market of mainland China? These issues 
should be examined through empirical studies.  
Compared with previous studies on the effect of auditor reputation in mainland China, this paper differs in the following 
ways. 
First, as stated previously, this paper attempts to determine which hypothesis, the Informational Hypothesis or Snap-up 
Hypothesis, dominates in explaining the “three lows” of the IPO market of mainland China. 
Second, this paper analyzes whether the dominance of the Informational Hypothesis or Snap-up Hypothesis under 
various market conditionshas different effects. This paper performs a robustness test based on the various market states 
defined by Lee et al. (2011, 2013). In addition to market state, robustness tests are also performed for factors such as 
offering scale andexchange board division. 
Finally, compared with previous studies, the samples chosen in this paper are characterized by the following: (a). the 
sample period covers many market states; (b). a large sample size is included in this study; (c). the sample period occurs 
after the implementation of the new accounting standards. Specifically, the sample period in this paper is May 2006 to 
August 2013 (88 months in total), which includes the bull (23 months), bear (23 months), and range-bound markets (26 
months)4. In addition, compared with other studies, the sample period in this paper covers more market states and has 
alarger samplesize of IPO firms. For example, Gao (2010) studied only 217 IPO firms from July 2006 to April 2008, 
when the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 300 Index was in a bull market state. Moreover, Qiu et al. (2013) 
studied only 223 IPO firms from June 2006 to December 2008, when the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 300 
Index was in a bull market state. Additionally, Hu and Feng (2013) studied only 517 nonfinancial firms from July 2009 
to April 2011, when the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 300 Index was in a bear market state. New accounting 
standards were implemented in January 1, 2007 for mainland China, and the focus of this paper is the relation between 
IRs and audits by the Big Four. This paper analyzed samples after January 2007 to avoid sample heterogeneity caused 
                                                        
4As stated above, the period studied in this paper is from January 2007 to August 2013 (totally 88 months). However, as 
it needs 8 months to distinguish market states, the actual period studied is from January 2007 to December 2012 (totally 
72 months).  
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al.(2008) asserted that the reliability of financial reports of listed firms in mainland China has been criticized. The credit 
rating and certification center of the research institute of the Ministry of Commerce (2013, 2014) stated that false 
financial statements of listed firms in mainland China are a serious problem. This paper also finds that, in mainland 
China, the proportion of listed firms audited by the Big Four is very low. Compared with other major IPO markets, the 
characteristics of the IPO market in mainland China can be summarized as “three lows,” the low reliability of audits 
performed by accounting firms other than the Big Four, low proportion of IPO audits performed by the Big Four (the 
IPO market share of the Big Four in mainland China is only 3.74%), and low balling ratio (the average balling ratio 
only 1.2%). These “three lows” cause investors to snap up shares offered by firms audited by the Big Four on the first 
day of listing and raise the closing price on the first day, causing the closing price to be much higher than the offering 
price, indicating high IPO underpricing. This is referred to as the Snap-up Hypothesis. This hypothesis is summarized in 
the flow chart shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Flow chart of snap up hypotheses 
If the flow chart in Figure 2 is supported, then the corresponding hypothesis is as follows. 
Hypothesis 2:The Snap-up Hypothesis, in other words, the hypothesis that the IRs of IPOs audited by the Big Four are 
higher than those of IPOs audited by other accounting firms. 
2.3 Empirical Model 
This paper mainly studies the impact of audits by the Big Four on IRs of IPOs, with reference to the empirical model 
designed by Lee et al. (2011). The original model of Lee et al. (2011) contained the variables of insider stockholding 
and block holder proportions. However, because no data are available on these two variables for mainland China, these 
two variables are excluded from our study. In addition, considering the high proportion of individual investors in 
mainland China, which may be easily affected by market sentiment, a new variable, the average IR (AIR) of individual 
shares, is added in this paper.  
Our model is as follows: 
ii
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(1) 
In the model, IR is measured by raw IR (RIR) and market-adjusted IR (MAIR) in the robustness test; m represents 
various market states, including bull, bear, and range-bound; AR4 is a dummy variable representing audits by the Big 
Four; R, AIR, M, LT, BR, and SIZE represent market risk, average IR of individual shares, market momentum, listing 
days (days between the offering day and listing days), balling ratio, and size of issuance, respectively. The data used 
here is cross-section data. 
2.4 Variables  
2.4.1 Initial Return, Raw Initial Return, and Market Adjusted Initial Return 
In the literature, IR is mainly expressed as raw IR (RIR) and market adjusted IR (MAIR), respectively. RIR represents 
the difference between the closing price on the first day of listing and the offering price, whereas MAIR represents the 
return after deducting the market index return.The formulas for both are as follows: 
RIR = [ (Pt- P0) / P0 ] × 100%                      (2) 
In this equation, Pt and P0 are the closing price on the first day of listing and the offering price, respectively.  
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MAIR = [ RIR - ( It- I0) / I0 ] × 100%               (3) 
In this equation, It and I0 are the market index on the first day of listing and the market index on the offering day, 
respectively. 
The dummy variable representing audits by the Big Four (AR4): 
In the literature, two main hypotheses have been proposed concerning the relation between IRs and audits by the Big 
Four. The two main hypotheses are the Informational Hypothesis and the Snap-up Hypothesis.The dummy variable AR4 
is set to 1 for IPOs audited by the Big Four and 0 for IPOs audited by other accounting firms.  
2.4.2 Market Risk 
Market risk reflects future uncertainty. Derrien and Womack (2003) as well as Lee et al. (2011) used the standard 
deviation of daily returns of the market index between the offering day and listing day to measure market risk, finding 
that the market risk was significantly and positively correlated with IRs. With reference to the arrangement of Lee et al. 
(2011), this paper uses the standard deviation of the daily returns of the market index between the offering day and 
listing day to measure market risk, and the formula is as follows:  
( )
D
rr
R
T
t
t
i

=
−
=
0
2
                            (4) 
In Formula (4), Ri represents the market risk of firm i, and t = 0, t = T, and rt represent the returns of market index on 
the offering day, the listed day, and day t, respectively. r represents the average value of the market returns between the 
offering day and listing day, and D represents the number of trading days from the offering day to the listing day.  
2.4.3 Average Initial Return of Shares 
The average IR of shares represents the average value of IRs on new shares during a given period and reflects market 
sentiment and investor expectation of IRs in the market. In this paper, this variable is used as a reference for the impact 
of IRs of new shares.  
NIRAIR
Tt
t
Ni
i
i=
=
=
=
=
0 0
                  (5) 
In Formula (5), IRi represents the IRs of firm i, and N is the total number of listed firms between t=0 and t=T.  
2.4.4 Market Momentum 
In the literature, such as the studies of Kunz and Aggarwal (1994), Loughran and Ritter (2002), Lyn and Zychowicz 
(2003), Derrien and Womack (2003), and Lee et al. (2011) a more prosperous market before an IPO has been found to 
increase the IRs. Lee et al. (2011) found that various market states have different effects on market momentum. In this 
paper, market momentum is calculated using the method developed by Lee et al. (2011).The formula is as follows: 
( ) 11
0
−

 +∏=
=
t
T
t
i rM                     (6) 
In Formula (6), Mi represents the market momentum of firm i, and rt represents the market index returns on day t5. 
Formula (6) shows that when the market index trends upward, the market momentum (M) is positive, and when the 
market index trends downward, the market momentum is negative. The data of the paper is cross-sectional data and not 
panel data. Market return is not the same for all firms. 
2.4.5 Listing Days, Balling Ratio, and the Size of Issuance 
Listing Days refer to the number of days between the offering day and listing day. The balling ratio reflects the hotness 
of new shares among investors; a lower balling ratio indicates higher hotness. The size of issuance represents the 
                                                        
5The formula of ri is as follows: ri = ( Pi-Pi-1) / Pi-1, there Pi-1and Pirepresents the market index on the day i-1 and day i, 
respectively. 
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offering scale of the listed firm and reflects the scale of funding through listing. In this paper, with reference to the 
arrangement of Lee et al. (2011), the natural logarithm of the size of issuance is calculated to mitigate the problem of 
scale of various independent variables.  
3. Data and the Distribution ofMarket States 
3.1 Source of Data 
On February 15, 2006, the Ministry of Finance held a news conference on the release of accounting and auditing 
standards in Beijing, including 39 accounting standards for enterprises and 48 auditing standards for certified public 
accountants. The accounting standards for enterprises have been implemented by listed firms since January 1, 2007 to 
consolidate the accounting system inmainland China with the international systems. The auditing standards for certified 
public accountants have been implemented since January 1, 2007. Considering the change of these standards, this paper 
uses firms listed from January 2007 to December 2012 as samples. The data on the listed firms are sourced from the 
Taiwan Economic Journal and RESSET database. The Shanghai and Shenzhen 300 Index is sourced from the website of 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The ranking information of accounting firms is sourced from the website of the Chinese 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.  
The samples in this paper cover 12 industries.6 After excluding a few samples with incomplete data, a total of 1,069 
IPO firms are selected, including firms listed in the A-share markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.7 
Therefore, 119 firms are listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 950 are listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the IPO 
of 201 firms was during a bull-market period, and the IPO of 868 firms was during a bear-market period. 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients  
Table 1 provides a list of statistical values of main variables and shows that the IRs of IPOs in mainland China have the 
following four characteristics: First, the value of IRs of IPOs in mainland China is high: The RIR is up to 59.40%, the 
MAIR is up to 59.55%, and a high return of nearly 60% can be obtained under average listing days (LT) of 12. Second, 
the IRs of IPOs inmainland China seem to be trending downward: the sample period in this paper is from January 2007 
to December 2012 (including A-share firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges), and the periods 
studied by Chan et al. (2004) and Chen et al. (2004) are from 1993 to 1998 and 1992 to 2000 (A-share market), 
respectively. The average IRs of the periods studied by Chan et al. (2004) and Chen et al. (2004)are 178%. The IRs of 
IPOs in mainland China seem to be trending thus downward. 
Third, some negative IRs are found, but the ratio of these returns is not high. Among the 1,069 listed firms studied, 144 
firms had negative RIRs, and 136 had negative MAIRs, yielding 13.47% and 12.72%, respectively. These two ratios are 
not high, and the average values of both the RIR and MAIR are nearly 60%, indicating that IPOs inmainland China are 
worthy of investor subscription during the offering phase. Finally, the RIR and MAIR are similar, including their average 
values, medians, maximum values, minimum values, and standard deviations, and no statistical difference is found 
between various RIR values and corresponding MAIR values. 
The average IR of IPOs audited by the Big Four (AR4) is 79.98%, significantly higher than the RIR of 59.4%, indicating 
the possibility of increasing IRs by association with the Big Four. In other words, Hypothesis 2 seems to besupported, 
and the Snap-up Hypothesis is dominant in the IPO market of mainland China.  
Moreover, in terms of the balling ratio (BR), the following two features are found: First, the IPO market of mainland 
China tends to be a hot-issue market. The average BR is very low (1.2%), and the minimum BR value is only 0.66%. In 
other words, only 6.6 of every 1,000 applicants can succeed in subscribing. Second, the possibility of unsalable IPO 
shares is low in mainland China. The maximum BR in the samples is 65.52%, less than 1, indicating that unsalable IPOs 
resulting from a lack of subscribers in China is unlikely. 
In this paper, the correlation coefficients among independent variables and variance inflation factor (VIF) are evaluated 
to avoid multicollinearity among independent variables. Furthermore, the Pearson correlation coefficients among the 
independent variables are all much lower than 0.7 and insignificant, and the VIF values are all much lower than 10. 
Multicollinearity is thus not a problem in this paper. Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients among the independent 
variables.  
 
 
                                                        
6No firm in the financial or insurance industries was listed from January 2007 to December 2012.  
7 No new B-share IPOs in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges are found from January 2007 to December 
2012. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables 
 
RIR 
(%) 
MRIR 
(%) 
RIR4 
(%) 
R 
(%) 
AIR 
(%) 
M 
(%) 
BR 
(%) 
LT 
(days) SIZE 
Mean 59.40 59.55 79.98 1.53 58.58 -0.15 1.20 12.11 20.34 
Median 34.57 34.50 47.88 1.34 37.86 -0.24 0.66 11.00 20.24 
Max 626.74 626.07 626.74 4.50 519.51 22.56 65.52 50.00 25.43 
Min -26.33 -23.43 -23.16 0.41 -15.87 -23.27 0.01 7.00 18.53 
S.D. 79.48 78.23 110.41 0.68 69.76 6.01 2.77 4.11 0.87 
Note: RIR is rawIR; MAIR is market adjusted IR; RIR4 represents rawIR of those financial reports audited by the Big 
Four; R represents market risk, the formula is as follows: 
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i, and t = 0, t = T, and rt respectively represents the return of market index on the offering day, the listed day and day t,
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trading days from the offering day to the listed day; AIR represents the average of IR, 
NIRAIR
Tt
t
Ni
i
i=
=
=
=
=
0 0 , IRi represents 
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;BR is balling ratio; LTrefers to the number of days from the offering day 
to the listed day; SIZE takes the natural logarithm of the offering size. 
Table 2. Correlation Coefficient 
AR4 R AIR M BR LT SIZE 
AR4 1 
R 0.03 1 
AIR -0.01 0.36 1 
M 0.01 -0.12 0.17 1 
BR 0.05 -0.18 -0.18 -0.02 1 
LT 0.03 0.22 0.03 0.24 -0.01 1 
SIZE 0.41 -0.12 -0.25 -0.01 -0.24 -0.01 1 
Note: In Table 2, AR4R, AIR,M,BR,LT and SIZErepresents dummy variable representing audit by the Big Four, market 
risk, average IR of individual share, market momentum, balling ratio, SIZE takes the natural logarithm of the offering 
size. 
3.3 Market State Division Method 
Pagan and Sossounov (2003) divided market states into bull and bear markets. Lee et al. (2011) and Lee et al. (2013) 
further developed this division method and added range-bound markets. In this paper, the modified division method is 
used, and the market states are divided into the bull, bear, and range-bound markets. The process is as follows. 
Step 1: Determine Peak and Trough 
Peak and trough refers to the highest and lowest point during a given period. According to a study by Pagan and 
Sossounov, if the conditions in Formula (7) are met, then position Pt is referred to as peak:  
],...,,...,[ 8118 ++−− >< ttttt PPPPP                           (7) 
In the previous formula, Ptrepresents the market index corresponding to period t. Formula (7) represents market index 
Pt, which should be higher than the market indexes in the previous eight consecutive months and following eight 
consecutive months. If Pt meets these conditions, the position of Pt is referred to as a peak. Similarly, if the conditions in 
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Formula (8) are met, then position Pt is called trough:  
],...,,...,[ 8118 ++−− <> ttttt PPPPP                             (8) 
In the previous formula, Pt represents the market index of month t. Formula (6) represents market index Pt, which 
should be lower than the market indexes in the previous eight consecutive months and the market indexes in the 
following eight consecutive months. If Pt meets these conditions, the position of Pt is referred to as a trough. For the 
purpose of determining a peak and trough, the previous and following eight consecutive months should be checked 
based on the assertion by Pagan and Sossounov (2003) that the cycle of the US stock market should exceed 15 months.  
Step 2: Determine Bull and Bear Markets 
A bear market refers to a continuous downward market trend of the market witha sufficient accumulative drop and 
downward duration. A bear market occurs when the following three conditions are met: First, the market transitions 
from peak to trough. Second, the accumulative drop is more than 20%in stock index values. Third, during the period 
from peak to trough is not shorter than 4 months. When the market reaches the trough, the downward trend ends, and 
the market rises. The 4-month durational requirement was determined by Pagan and Sossounov (2003), Lee et al. (2011), 
and Lee et al. (2013) with reference to Hamilton (1919) and Dow Theory (developed by Charles Dow), and verified by 
empirical analysis of the US stock market. Edwards et al. (2003) also used this 4-month durational requirement. 
Similarly, a bull market refers to a continuous upward trend of the market, with a sufficient accumulative rise and 
upward duration. A bull market occurs when the following three conditions are met: First, the market transitions from 
trough to peak. Second, the accumulative rise is more than 20%in stock index values. Third, the period from trough to 
peak is not shorter than 4 months. When the market reaches to the peak, the upward trend ends, and the market drops. 
The previous two steps were developed by Pagan and Sossounov (2003), with two major modifications made by Lee et 
al. (2011) and Lee et al. (2013): First, a range-bound market was added; second, the classification of a bull, bear and 
neutral market are robust with a window length of 8 to 10 months.  
Step 3: Determine Range-Bound Markets 
After determining bull and bear markets, the remaining parts that cannot be defined as bull or bear markets are called 
range-bound markets in this paper. Katsenelson (2007) mentioned that when stock prices were narrow in valuation, the 
market was range-bound. Using Katsenelson’s definition, this period is defined as a range-bound market in this paper. 
3.4 Results of Market State Division 
The sample period in this paper is from January 2007 to December 2012, and the samples are firms listed in the A-share 
market of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The Shanghai and Shenzhen 300 Index is thus used as a 
substitute for the market index.8 According to the studies by Lee et al. (2011) and Lee et al. (2013), 8 months is 
required before and after the study period; our market index selection period is thus from May 2006 to August 2013, 
covering 88 months. The bull market spans more than three intervals and covers 31 months, constituting 35.62% of total 
samples. Thebear market spans more than three intervals and covers 48 months, constituting 55.17% of total samples. 
The range-bound market spans more than one interval and covers 8 months, constituting 9.19% of total samples. In the 
intervals used in the empirical model, the bull market covers 23 months, constituting 32% ofthe total samples, with an 
average market return of 10%. The bear market covers 48 months, constituting 68% of the total samples, with an 
average market return of -5%.The empirical model contains no range-bound market. The market state division is shown 
in Figure 2, and the information on the market state division is summarized in Table 3.9 
 
 
                                                        
8The Shanghai and Shenzhen 300 Index is a share market index calculated using 300 A-shares in the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. These samples cover approximately 60% of the market value of these two markets and are 
highly representative.  
9Here, the average return of the market under various market states is equal to the average value of the market returns of 
all months covered by such states.  
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Figure 3. Result of market states division 
Note: Fig. 3 is a bar graph of market states, the horizontal axis represents time (months), and the vertical axis represents 
the market index (CSI 300 Index).In order to divide the market states, Fig.3shows the change of the market index from 
May 2006 to August 2013, but the market index used in the empirical model is from January 2007 to December 2012. 
Thus the figure divides empirical sample and full sample with line of dashes. Within two dotted lines are the empirical 
part, white is bearish market states, dark state is bullish market states, light gray is the range-bound market state. 
4. Empirical Results and Robustness Tests 
The empirical results of this paper are summarized in Table 3, and Table 3 shows the empirical results of the effect of 
Big Four auditing (AR4). The results show that Hypothesis 2 is accepted. In other words, the Snap-up Hypothesis is 
dominant in the IPO market of mainland China. Therefore, the IRs of IPOs being audited by the Big Four are higher 
than those IPOs being audited by other accounting firms. The result is as follows. 
Table 3 shows that the coefficient of AR4 is 0.63, which is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of AR4 is 
significantly positive, which indicates that audits by the Big Four can significantly increase the IRs of the firms audited, 
showing that hypothesis 2 is accepted. In other words, according to the samples in this paper, we find that the Snap-up 
Hypothesis is dominant, indicating that the hypothesis that “the IRs of IPOs audited by the Big Four are higher than 
those of IPOs audited by other accounting firms” is accepted. 
The previous findings support that the Snap-up Hypothesis is dominant in the mainland Chinese IPO market, indicating 
that IRs increase if IPOs are audited by the Big Four, which have superior reputations compared with local accounting 
firms. This finding contrasts with the results of studies conducted in other IPO markets, which have indicated that the 
Informational Hypothesis is dominant, meaning that the IRs decrease if IPOs are audited by the Big Four. Studies by 
Teoh and Wong (1993), Beatty (1989), Michaely and Shaw (1995), and Lee et al. (2011) have reached this conclusion. 
Table 3. Empirical Results 
Dependent Variable: RIR
C 4.32(10.04)c
AR4 0.63(6.90)c
RISK 9.27(3.49)c
AIR 0.67(25.80) c
M 1.53(5.44) c
BR -1.10(-1.86)a
LT 0.01(2.74)c
SIZE -0.22(-10.34)c
Samples 
R2 
1069
0.56
Note: 1. The t value. a, b, c represent the significance in 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 2. AR4, R,AIR,M,BR,Lt 
and SIZErepresents dummy variable representing audit by the Big Four, market risk, average IR of individual share, 
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market momentum, balling ratio, SIZE takes the natural logarithm of the offering size. 3. The t-ratio is reported in the 
parentheses. 
The main cause of the dominance of the Snap-up Hypothesis in the mainland Chinese IPO market may be as follows: 
The auditing quality of local accounting firms in China is low (Lin and Lin, 2009; credit rating and certification center 
of the research institute of the Ministry of Commerce, 2013); comparatively, the credibility of the Big Four in China is 
high; the Big Four perform a low proportion of the IPO audits in China (market share of the Big Four in IPOs is only 
3.74%); finally, the balling ratio of IPOs in China is very low (only 1.20% in our study samples), which causes 
investors to snap up IPO shares from firms audited by the Big Four on the first day of listing. This leads to increased 
closing prices on the first day that greatly exceed offering prices, causing high IPO underpricing. 
In this paper, the trading volumes and turnover ratio of the samples on the first day of listing are further collected, and 
the IPO firms audited by highly credible accounting firms are found to cause snap-up tide. The average trading volumes 
(turnover ratio) of IPO firms audited by the Big Four in bull and bear markets are 311,590,380 shares (15.01%) and 
27,942,517 shares (7.53%), respectively. These greatly exceed the average volumes of IPO firms audited by other 
accounting firms in bull and bear markets (19,854,475 shares (5.22%) and 17,692,299 shares (3.13%), respectively). 
The former average trading volumes are 15.69 (2.88) and 1.58 (2.41) times the latter average volumes, respectively. 
This indicates that the occurrence of the snap-up tide in mainland China.  
Because of the previously mentioned snap-up tide and raised stock prices on the first day of listing, investors may 
actively subscribe shares of firms to be listed at the time of offering and then sell them on the first day of listing to 
obtain considerable profits.  
4.1 Robustness Tests 
To test the robustness of the previous empirical results, in this section the following robustness tests are performed: 
empirical analysis using market adjusted IR instead of raw IR as the dependent variable, analysis based on stock market 
division, analysis based on market states division, and analysis based on offering scale division. The test results are 
respectively shown in Table 4, Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7. It can be seen that the test results are close to the empirical 
results provided in previous section, without significant structural change. Thus, the conclusion of this study is robust.  
Table 4. Empirical results using market adjusted IR as dependent variable 
Dependent variable MRIR
C 4.32(10.04)c
AR4 0.63(6.90)c
RISK 9.27(3.49)c
AIR 0.67(25.80)c
M 0.53 (1.88)a
BR -1.10(-1.86)a
LT 0.01(2.74)c
SIZE -0.22(-10.34)c
Samples 1069
R2 0.57
Note: 1. Thistable replace raw IR with market adjusted IR as dependent variable on empirical analysis 2. Definition of 
the relevant explanatory variables refers the instructions of Table 3. 3. The t-ratio is reported in the parentheses. 
In Table 4, market adjusted IR instead of raw IR is used as the dependent variable, and the results show that the 
coefficient of AR4 is 0.63, significant at the 1 per cent level. This result shows that hypothesis 2 is accepted. Thus, 
when market adjusted IR is used as IR, the empirical results also supports the hypothesis 2, just like the analysis using 
raw IR as the dependent variable.  
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Table 5. Empirical results of distinguishing different Listed Exchange 
Dependent variable: RIR
Market states Shanghai Stock Exchange Shengzhen Stock Exchange  
C 2.61 6.86(2.84)c (12.00)c
AR4 0.28 0.78(2.41)b (4.86)c
RISK 21.07 5.68(2.69)c (2.04)b
AIR 0.39 0.67(2.46)b (25.63)c
M 3.32 1.15(3.57)c (3.97)c
BR -3.36 -0.45(-2.88)c (-0.67)
LT -0.01 0.01(-0.85) (3.24)c
SIZE -0.11 -0.34(-2.59)c (-12.28)c
Samples 119 950
R2 0.39 0.62
Note: 1. Thistable divides samples listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange and ShenzhenStock Exchangeon empirical 
analysis.2. Definition of the relevant independent variables refers to the instructions of Table 3. 3. The t-ratio is reported 
in the parentheses. 
In Table 5, the samples are divided into firms listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange and firms listed in Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, and the results show that both the samples from Shanghai Stock Exchange and the samples from Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange support the Hypothesis 2, just like the results of Table 3. This indicates that the empirical results of this 
paper are independent of the stock exchange used.  
Table 6. Empirical results of distinguishing different Market States 
Dependent variable: RIR
Market States Bull Market Bear Market
C 4.04 4.08(3.13)c (9.18) c
AR4 0.53 0.72(2.03)b (7.76) c
RISK 13.61 8.37(1.53) (3.16) c
AIR 0.62 0.63(12.34) c (16.57) c
M 0.42 0.12(0.51) (0.38)
BR -33.04 -0.91(-3.29) c (-1.72) a
LT -0.01 0.01(-0.80) (3.75) c
SIZE -0.17 -0.21(-2.81) c (-9.49) c
Samples 201 868
R2 0.64 0.47
Note: 1. This table divides the samples listed in bull market and bear market on empirical analysis. 2. The way we 
dividing bull market and bear market in this paper refers to [3.3 Market states division Method]. 3. Definition of the 
relevant independent variables refers to the instructions of Table 3. 4. The t-ratio is reported in the parentheses. 
In Table 6, the samples are divided into firms listed in bull market and bear market, and the results show that both 
coefficients are positive and significant, supporting the Hypothesis 2. This indicates that the empirical results of this 
paper are independent of the market states.  
In Table 7, the samples are divided into firms of different scales, and the results show that all the three coefficients are 
positive and significant, supporting thehypothesis 2. This indicates that the empirical results of this paper are 
independent of the scale of the listed firms.  
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Table 7. Empirical results of distinguishing different offering size 
Dependent variable: RIR
Offering Size Big Scale Medium Scale Small Scale 
C -0.02 6.50 14.54
(-0.02) (3.52)c (5.28)c
AR4 0.21 1.24 2.28
(2.59)c (2.63)c (5.73)c
RISK 15.92 2.67 0.19
(4.01)c (0.76) (0.03)
AIR 0.53 0.57 0.65
(11.71)c (15.31)c (13.04)c
M 2.32 1.48 0.73
(5.95)c (4.07)c (1.25)
BR -0.92 -3.54 -14.12
(-2.02)b (-2.66)c (-2.33)b
LT 0.01 0.01 0.02
(1.35) (2.00)b (2.07)b
SIZE -0.01 -0.32 -0.73
(-0.31) (-3.50)c (-5.21)c
Samples 321 428 320
R2 0.49 0.50 0.62
Note: 1. This table divides the samples to big scale, medium scale and small scale on empirical analysis. 2. In 
accordance with the offering size, we regard the biggest 30%offering size of all listed firms as the big scale, and middle 
40% as the medium scale, smallest 30%as the small scale. 3. Definition of the relevant independent variables refers the 
instructions of Table 3. 4. The t-ratio is reported in the parentheses. 
5. Conclusions and Suggestions 
This paper mainly exploresthe relation between IRs and audits by the Big Four. The sample period is from January 2007 
to December 2012 (the new accounting standards in China is implemented in January 2007 for integrating with the 
international standards). The objects of this study are 1,069 IPO firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges. 
Many previous studies have proposed the Informational Hypothesis, which states that the IRs of initial public offerings 
(IPOs) being audited by the Big Four are lower than those IPOs being audited by other accounting firms. Oppositely, 
this paper proposes the Snap-up Hypothesis due to consider the IPOs in mainland China are characterized by “three 
lows,”: the low reliability of audits being performed by non-Big Four, low proportion of IPOs audits being performed 
by the Big Four, and low balling ratio. These “three lows” features indicate that the Snap-up Hypothesis applies in the 
IPOs market of mainland China. In other words, the IRs of the IPOs being audited by the Big Four are higher than those 
IPOs being audited by other accounting firms due to the Big Four have the superior reputations. 
As above mentioned, because the snap-up tide and raised stock prices on the first-day listing, investors may purchase 
the shares when offering and sell them on the first-day listing to obtain considerable profits.  
This paper further collects the trading volumes and turnover ratio on the first day, and selects the Big Four audited IPOs 
by snap-up tide. For example, in the bullish market, the average volumes of IPOsbeing audited by the Big Four are 
311,590,380 shares, which is 15.69 times as large as others (19,854,475 shares). 
To determine if the Snap-up Hypothesis is supportedin the IPO market of mainland China, several robustness tests are 
performed: empirical analysis using market adjusted IR rather than raw IR as the dependent variable as well as analyses 
based on exchange board division, market state division, and offering scale division. There is no significant structural 
change occurs on the test results. The conclusion regarding the dominance of the Snap-up Hypothesis is robust thus.  
As above mentioned, because the snap-up tide and raised stock prices on the first-day listing, investors may purchase 
the shares when offering and sell them on the first-day listing to obtain considerable profits. 
References 
Balvers, R. J., McDonald, B., & Miller, R. (1988). Underpricingof New Issues and the Choice of Auditors as a 
SignalofInvestment Banker Reputation. The Accounting Review, 63, 605-622. 
Beatty, R. P. (1989). Auditor reputation and the pricing of initial public offerings. Accounting Review, 64 (4), 693-709. 
Beatty, R. P., & Ritter, J. (1986). Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing ofinitial public offerings, 
Journal of Financial Economics,15, 213-233. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(86)90055-3 
Cai, Y. Q., Ni, B. H., Huang, M. Z., & Liao, L. M. (2008). Audit fee and pricing in Chinese Mainland: a empirical study 
on the listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Journal of Soochow Economic and Business, 63, 1-28. 
Applied Economics and Finance                                                                 Vol. 4, No. 4; 2017 
57 
 
Chan, K., Wang, J., & Wei, K. C. J. (2004). Underpricing and Long-Term Performance of IPOs in China, Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 10, 409-430. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(03)00023-3 
Chang, X., Gygax, A. F., Oon, E., & Zhang, H. F. (2008). Audit quality, auditor compensation and initial public 
offering underpricing. Accounting and Finance, 48, 391-416. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2008.00275.x 
Chen, G., Firth, M., & Kim, J. B. (2004). IPO underpricing in China’s new stock markets. Journal of Multinational 
Financial Management, 14(3), 283-302. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mulfin.2003.07.007 
Chen, H. M., & Li, D. (2004). A positive research on the hypothesis of the certified accountant off ices reputation of 
short-run underpricing on the stocks of IPO in China. Audit and Economy Research, 1, 26-29(in Chinese). 
Chi, J., & Padgett, C. (2005). The performance and long-run characteristics of the Chinese IPO market.Pacific 
Economic Review, 10(4), 451-469. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2005.00285.x 
Derrien, F., & Womack, K. L. (2003). Auctions vs. bookbuilding and the control of underpricing in hot IPO markets. 
Review of Financial Studies, 16(1), 31-61. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/16.1.0031 
Edwards, S., Biscarri, J. G., & Pérez de Gracia, F. (2003). Stock market cycles, financial liberalization and volatility. 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 22(7), 925-955.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2003.09.011 
Fan, J. P. H., & Wong, T. J. (2005). Do External Auditors Performa Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets? 
Evidence from East Asia. Journal of Accounting Research, 43, 35-72. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2004.00162.x 
Ferri, G., & Liu, L. G. (2010). Honor thy creditorsbefore thyshareholders: are the profits of Chinese state=owned 
enterprises real? Asian Economic Papers, 9(3), 50-71. https://doi.org/10.1162/ASEP_a_00025 
Frankel, R., Johnson, M., & Nelson, K. (2002). The relation between auditors’ fees for nonaudit services and earnings 
management. The Accounting Review, 77, 71-105. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.71 
Gao, Y. (2010). What comprises IPO initial returns: Evidence from the Chinese market.Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 
18(1), 77-89. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2009.08.001 
Hamilton, W. P. (1919). Stock market analysis,Wall StreetJournal, 9 (August) (Reprinted in Rhea, R. (1932).The Dow 
Theory, Barron’s, New York, pp. 181–2). 
Holland, K. M., & Horton, J. G. (1993). Initial PublicOfferings on the Unlisted Securities Market: The Impact of 
ProfessionalADvisers. Accounting and Business Research, 24(93), 19-34.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.1993.9729461 
Hu, D., & Feng, Q. G. (2013). Information environment, audit quality and IPO underpricing: based on the A-share IPO 
firms during 2009~2011.Accounting Research, 2013, 2, 78-95. 
Katsenelson, V. N. (2007). Active Value Investing: Making Money in Range Bound Markets, John Wiley and Sons, Inc 
Publishing, New York, NY. 
Kunz, R. M., & Aggarwal, R. (1994). Why initial public offerings are underpriced: Evidence from Switzerland. Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 18(4), 705-723. https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-4266(93)00016-I 
Lee, J. S., Kuo, C. T., & Yen, P. H. (2011). Market States and Initial Returns: Evidence from Taiwan IPOs.Emerging 
Markets Finance and Trade, 47(2), 6–20. https://doi.org/10.2753/REE1540-496X470201 
Lee, J. S., Yen, P. H., & Chan, K. C. (2013). Market States and Disposition Effect: Evidence from Taiwan Mutual Fund 
Investors. Applied Economics, 45(10), 1331–1342. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2011.617696 
Lee, W. Y., Jiang, C. X., & Indro, D. C. (2002). Stock market volatility, excess returns, and the role of investor 
sentiment. Journal of Banking & Finance, 26(12), 2277-2299. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(01)00202-3 
Lin, C. J., & Lin, X. L. (2009). Does auditor reputation affect equity pricing: the evidence from IPO marketization? 
Accounting Review, 49, 67-72. 
Liu, W., & Tan, Z. Y. (2009). Empirical Study on signal transmission of auditor reputation. Friends of Accounting, 11, 
105-107. 
Ljungqvist, A., Nanda, V., & Singh, R. (2001). Hot markets, investor sentiment, and IPO pricing. Journal of Business, 
79(4), 1667-1702. https://doi.org/10.1086/503644 
Loughran, T., & Ritter, J. R. (2002). Why don't issuers get upset about leaving money on the table in IPOs? Review of 
Financial Studies, 15(2), 413-444. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/15.2.413 
Lyn, E. O., & Zychowicz , E. J. (2003) .The performance of new equity offerings in Hungary and Poland. Global 
Applied Economics and Finance                                                                 Vol. 4, No. 4; 2017 
58 
 
Finance Journal, 14(2), 181-195. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1044-0283(03)00011-5 
Michaely, R., & Shaw, W. H. (1995). Does the choice of auditor convey quality in an initial public offering? Financial 
Management, 15-30. https://doi.org/10.2307/3665948 
Pagan, A. R., & Sossounov, K. A. (2003). A simpleframework for analyzing bull and bear markets. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 18, 23–46. https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.664 
Qiu, D. Y., Peng, H., & Yao, Y. (2013). Auditor reputation and IPOs underpricing: An empirical study based on SME 
board market.  Fujian Tribune(The Humanities & Social Sciences Monthly),8, 36-43. 
Rock, K. (1986). Why new issues are underpriced, Journal of FinancialEconomics, 15, 187-212. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(86)90054-1 
Song, S. L., Tan, J. S., & Yi, Y. (2014). IPO initial returns in China: Underpricing or overvaluation? China Journal of 
Accounting Research, 7, 31–49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2013.12.001 
Su, D., & Fleisher, B. M. (1999). An empirical investigation of underpricing in Chinese IPOs. Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal, 7(2), 173-202. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-538X(99)00005-0 
Teoh, S. H., & Wong, T. J. (1993). Perceived auditor quality and the earnings response coefficient.Accounting Review, 
346-366. 
The Credit Rating and Certification Center of the Research Institute of the Ministry of Commerce. (2013). According to 
the Appraisal Report on Financial Safety of Non-financial Listed Firms in China in 2013. 
The Credit Rating and Certification Center of the Research Institute of the Ministry of Commerce. (2014). According to 
the Appraisal Report on Financial Safety of Non-financial Listed Firms in China in 2014. 
Tian, L. H. (2011). Regulatory underpricing: Determinants of Chinese extreme IPO returns. Journal of Empirical 
Finance, 18, 78-90.  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2010.10.004 
Wang, B., Xin, Q. Q., & Yang, D. M. (2009). Whether auditor reputation influences share pricing: evidence from IPO 
market in China. Accounting Research, 11, 73-81. 
Wang, L., & Zhang, J. T. (2005). Empirical study on the phenomenon of IPO underpricing in Shanghai A-share market. 
Market Modernization, 26, 101-117. 
Yang, S., Wang, T., & Jiang, S. (2007) .What Explains the High Returns to the IPOs of China's A‐Shares? Journal of 
Economic Policy Reform, 10(4), 297-308. https://doi.org/10.1080/17487870701552012 
Zeng, X. Y., & Shi, S. (2011). The effect of accounting firms to IPO pricing. Management Engineer, 5, 29-31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyrights 
Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to the journal. 
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly 
cited. 
